So, Alice's thought is true if and only if Alice's thought is not true, which is self-contradictory and so impossible.
The assumption that (T) holds in full generality leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, (T) does not hold in full generality.
This means that the liar paradox does not provide a good reason to suppose that thoughts or experiences cannot be about themselves. And Parfit's example seems a possible case of such a self-reflexive thought.
What Conceptual Resources Are Required?
What conceptual resources are required to have self-reflexive thoughts? Obviously, a 4 thinker must have whatever resources are required to have thoughts at all. If thought requires the use of concepts, a thinker must have some concepts to think with. But does a thinker have to have the concept of a thought in order to have a self-reflexive thought?
It might seem that if Alice is to have a thought about a thought at all she needs to have a concept of a thought. And it might be argued that to have such a concept one must have some sort of conception of thinkers and their thoughts, a theory of mind, perhaps.
And it might also be argued that very young children and at least some animals lack the relevant theory of mind and for that or some other reason fail to have the sort of concept of a thought that is required in order to have thoughts about thoughts, including selfreflexive thoughts that are about themselves. Similarly, it might be argued that very young children and at least some animals cannot have self-reflexive experiences.
A number of issues arise here. One is this. Consider a young child who has not yet acquired a theory of mind and who does not have a concept of a thought. The child does have thoughts but is too young to be able to think that others have thoughts and so perhaps unable to think that it has thoughts, because (it might be argued) the child does not have the conception of a thought as a thought of one or another thinker. The child has no concept of a thinker, that is of a creature that can think. Still, it seems that the child might have trouble falling asleep, have some sense that its worrying is part of the problem, and even have the thought "this is going to make it hard for me to fall asleep,"
where the "this" refers to that very thought, although (by hypothesis) not categorized as "this thought," because the child does not have the concept of a thought yet.
A different, if related, issue is what it counts as having a self-reflexive thought.
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One way to respond is to say that a thought is self-reflexive if it contains a reference to or representation of itself. But consider Alice seeing herself in a mirror, not recognizing herself, thinking that the smiling person she sees is thinking a happy thought. Perhaps in this way Alice has a thought that is contingently or accidentally about that very thought, the thought that that very thought is a happy one. But, depending on our purposes, we might not want to count such a thought as self-reflexive, because it is not a thought de se to use David Lewis's (1979) terminology.
Furthermore, I want to suggest that we might want to count Alice as having a selfreflexive thought even if it does not contain any sort of specific reference to or representation of itself, at least in the way that Alice's worry about insomnia might contain a specific reference to itself. Here are four other related ways in which a thought might count as self-reflexive.
1. A thought may make use of a "token reflexive" notion. 
Thoughts about Oneself
Suppose Betty has the following thought.
(1) I am less than six feet tall.
Such a thought is true if and only if the person thinking the thought is less than six feet tall. The truth conditions of the thought instance refer to that very thought. So, it might be said that there is a sense in which the content of the thought is a claim about the thought and so a sense in which the thought is about itself.
Following Reichenbach (1947) , we can say the thought has a "token reflexive" aspect. The truth conditions of a token or instance of the thought are conditions that are in part about that token. We might suppose that the thought element "I" has the (Reichenbachian) content "the thinker of this thought," i.e., "the thinker of the thought containing this very element".
Of course, in reporting Betty's thought (1) we would say something like (2) Betty thinks that she is less than six feet tall.
We would not normally say, (3) Betty thinks that her thought's thinker is less than six feet tall.
Still, Betty's thought might be self-reflexive in the way that Reichenbach's analysis suggests even if we would not report it as self-reflexive. We certainly recognize a difference between a first person thought and a third person report of that thought.
Consider the ambiguity of (4) Betty thinks that she is less than six feet tall and so does Carl.
(4-1) Betty thinks that she is less than six feet tall and Carl thinks she is less than six feet tall.
(4-2) Betty thinks that she is less than six feet tall and Carl thinks that he is less than six feet tall.
In the second interpretation (4-2), what Betty and Carl have in common is that they both think (1). Or they both think something that might be translated as (1).
To use Kaplan's (1979) terminology, in the first interpretation (4-1) Betty and Carl's thoughts have the same (propositional) "content" but different "characters" and in the second interpretation (4-2) their thoughts have different propositional contents but the same character.
It might be suggested that the "propositional content" of a thought can be represented as the set of possible worlds in which that content is true. Quine (1968) and Lewis (1979) respond that thoughts like (1) have what Lewis calls a "de se" character that is better represented as a set of centered worlds, centered on the individual with the thought. Or better: centered on the individual with the thought at the time of the thought.
Or, perhaps even centered on that thought token! But, if the content of the thought is centered on the thought token, isn't that a respect in which the thought is about the thought token?
Visual Experiences
This discussion about the way the content of a thought is centered on the thinker, and maybe even the thought token, suggests a possibly related comparison with the perspectival point of view characteristic of visual experience. There is a sense in which perceptual experience represents its point of view and another sense in which it does not.
Consider ways in which visual experiences might be self-reflexive. Many and perhaps all visual experiences have a certain perspectival content. That is they present or represent what is perceived from a certain point of view-"from here." The point of view is in a certain way manifested in experience, which is not to say that the point from which the scene is presented as viewed is normally itself seen. People do not normally see their own eyes, unless they are looking in mirrors, and they presumably never see their visual experiences, at least in the sense in which they see external objects. Things visual experience presents as seen are presented as having certain properties "from here". One thing is represented as to the left of or in front of another as viewed from here, for example.
Things are presented as at various relative distances, some as nearer and some as farther from here (Harman, 1990) .
So, in one respect a visual experience does not normally represent its point of view-it does not represent its point of view as something seen. But in another respect such an experience does normally represent its point of view-it represents objects as related in certain ways to that point of view. Using terminology suggested by Perry
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(1998) for a related case, we might say that the experience "concerns" a certain "unarticulated" point of view even if it is not "explicitly about" that point of view.
Furthermore, a visual experience provides information about its own cause. A veridical experience of seeing a tree carries the information that the experience was caused in part by perception of a tree of a certain sort, at a certain distance, etc. A perceiver can use this information to negotiate the environment and to react to changes in the environment, so the information is we might say functionally part of the content of experience.
Some versions of conceptual role semantics and some versions of functionalist accounts of psychological states and events claim that the content of such states and events is determined by the functional or conceptual role of aspects of those states and events (for discussion see Greenberg and Harman, forthcoming) .
In addition, Sean Kelly (2005) , relying on Merleau-Ponty (1962), argues that experience often has a normative aspect, providing a felt tendency toward acting in a way that would provide a better view of one or another aspect of the object. He suggests that something similar explains differences in the way an object looks depending on how far away it is. If this is correct, it indicates a sense in which the content of visual experience is self-reflexive in indicating how that very experience might be improved.
The informational content of the visual experience that φ might be or include something like "This very experience is the result of perceiving that φ." Searle (1983) observes that someone perceives that φ only if his or her experience is caused in a relevant way by what makes it the case that φ. The experience is a successful perception only if that condition is met. Searle takes the "intentional content" of an experience to be its success condition, so he takes the intentional content of an experience to be self-reflexive.
(This use of "intentional content" is meant to cover content of all sorts of mental states and events, not just the content of intentions in the ordinary sense. I will discuss that narrower topic, the content of intentions, in the following section.)
It might be objected that an imaginative experience of a leafy tree can be a success in the relevant sense-imagining that that there is tree here-without the experience's arising from an encounter with such a tree. But the imaginative experience might have the same content as a visual experience. So, the objection continues, the content of the visual experience cannot include the condition that the experience arises from an encounter with a 6 tree.
One possible reply is that two experiences might share certain content without having exactly the same content. There is a "difference in feel" between imagining something and perceiving it, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the difference has something to do with what a person takes to be the cause of the experience.
Another reply (possibly at odds with the first) is that the relevant sort of imagining is imagining seeing something. In this view, the imagining contains the content contained that might be part of a perceptual experience but contains it bracketed, as it were, and marked as merely imagined.
Furthermore, if Searle's self-reflexive intentional content plays a functional role in how a person reacts to perceptual experience, that provides a further respect in which the content of the experience is self-reflexive.
Again it might be objected that, since a person can have perceptual experiences without having any concept of perceptual experiences, it does not make sense to suppose that the experience is self-reflexive. But first, as suggested by Perry (1998) , the content of one's experiences and thoughts may have "nonarticulated" aspects. And, second, the content of perceptual experiences (and thoughts) may have nonconceptual aspects, where the content can be attributed to the experience (or thought) in virtue of the way the experience or thought functions in a person's psychology (Kelly, 2000) .
Intentions
I now want to discuss the narrower sort of "intentional content," the content of intentions to do something. There are reasons to treat intentions to do something as self- We might say that an agent's positive intention to ψ is successful only if the agent intentionally ψs, where that involves the agent's ψ -ing in something like the way in which the agent intended to ψ . Reflection on cases suggests that, if an agent's intention to ψ is a positive intention, the agent intentionally ψs only if the agent ψs because of that intention. (Harman 1976 , Searle 1983 . So the success condition associated with a positive intention to ψ includes that the agent ψs because of that intention-the intention leads the agent to ψ. And, as with perceptual content, if the intentional content of an intention is given by its success conditions, then the intentional content of an intention is self-reflexive-the intention is the intention to ψ in consequence of having that very intention.
Another way to argue for a similar conclusion is this. Given that an agent intentionally ψs only if the agent ψs in the way the agent intends, the principle that an agent intentionally ψs only if the agent ψs as the result of intending to ψ would be explained by the assumption that the way the agent intends to ψ involves the agent's intention's leading to the agent's ψ-ing. Even though there is a sense in which positive intentions refer to or concern themselves as leading to the intended outcome, this does not mean that such a reference is articulated in the intentions. It is therefore quite possible for young children to form intentions even if they have no explicit concept of intentions or of self-reference.
Unlike positive intentions, negative intentions, like the intention not to go to the Faculty meeting, do not work by getting the intender to bring about the intended state of affairs. This raises the question why someone would even bother to form such a negative intention. One reason is that a person might do so in order to settle the matter as to whether he or she will go to the meeting. And that answer suggests a more general principle that would apply to all intentions-positive, negative, and conditional: To intend that φ is to intend that that very intention settles it that φ. In the case of positive intentions, an intender can settle it that the intended result will happen only by intending to bring that result about. But that is not required for negative and conditional intentions.
It is often said that the difference between intention and belief has to do with "direction of fit." We might speculate that one such difference between these types of mental is that, whereas the content of an intention that φ is something like, "My being in this mental state settles it that φ," the content of a belief that φ is something like "I am in this mental state because of something that settles it that φ."
KK and TT Theses
Turning to a somewhat different topic, I observe that, if beliefs can be self-reflexive, a certain sort of objection to the so-called KK thesis and other related principles seems to fail.
(KK) If one knows that φ, one knows that one knows that φ.
(TT) If one thinks that φ, one thinks that one thinks that φ.
The objection is that such theses lead to infinite regresses and imply that if one knows or thinks anything, one knows or thinks infinitely many distinct things. Betty knows that she is less than six feet tall, so she knows that she knows that she is less than six feet tall, so she knows that she knows that she knows that she is less than six feet tall, and so on.
But she does not have the time or the mental space for all this knowledge and all those thoughts, so the (KK) and (TT) theses cannot be true.
That particular objection can be avoided if knowledge and thoughts can be selfreferential. Suppose that in knowing that φ, one knows something of the form, "φ and I know this," where this refers to the whole conjunctive thought. And suppose that in thinking that φ, one thinks something of the form, "φ and I think this," where this refers to the whole conjunctive thought.
Consider the following possible self-reflexive knowledge:
(7) I am less than six feet tall and I know this.
Betty's knowledge that she knows (7) is not distinct from what she knows in knowing (7) so there is no unwelcome regress.
Of course, if Betty's thought is in words, the words are "I am less than six feet tall" not "I am less than six feet tall and I know this." So, what does it mean to say that she has that more complex thought?
One possible answer is that her thinking the words, "I am less than six feet tall,"
constitutes her having the thought expressed in (7). Her tokening those words functions as having the thought expressed in (7), for example, allowing her to answer such questions as "Do you know whether you think that you are less than six feet tall?"
Speaker Meaning and Common Knowledge
A related point arises from Grice's (1957) initial account of speaker meaning appealed to a self-reflexive intention: "A meant NN something by x" is roughly equivalent to "A uttered
x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention"
.
In his original discussion, Grice added, "This seems to involve a reflexive paradox, but it does not really do so." Later, as various complications were noted, Grice (1969) and Schiffer (1972) replaced the self-reflexive analysis with ones involving a series of intentions, with later intentions referring to the earlier intentions. This led to issues about the existence of the potentially infinite regress of intentions required, issues that could have been avoided by staying with self-referential formulations.
It seemed that additional clauses were needed to avoid counter-examples, but as clauses were added it became unclear how speakers could have such complicated intentions. Again it would have been better to have kept the original analysis with its selfreflexive intention.
I assume Grice's worry about self-reflexive paradox is the worry that selfreference leads to paradox. But, as already noted, considerations about such paradoxes do not imply that there cannot be thoughts about themselves. So, Grice's original formulation of his analysis of speaker meaning can be kept, avoiding the enormous difficulties that arose from trying to formulate a version without thoughts about themselves.
A similar point applies to the kind of analysis offered by Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972) of what it is for it to be common knowledge that φ among a group of people. Their basic idea was to suppose it is common knowledge that φ in a group of people G if and only if: (1) everyone in G knows that φ, (2) everyone in G knows (1), (3) everyone in G knows (2), etc.
As in discussions of Grice's analysis of speaker meaning, this sort of analysis of common knowledge led to worries about how many such iterations an ordinary person can handle. A better analysis of this sort would appeal to self-referential knowledge with a relatively simple clause that implies all the iterations, taking it to be common knowledge that φ in a group of people G if and only if everyone in G knows "φ and everyone in G knows this," where the final "this" refers to the conjunction in question.
Appeals to Higher Order States
There are reasons to suppose that all or most psychological states and events are selfreflexive in one or another way. That result may be bothersome for various philosophical theories that attempt to explain one or another notion in terms of higher-order thoughts.
For example, theories that would distinguish values from mere desires by appeal to second order desires might have difficulty (Harman 1993) .
Similarly for theories that identify conscious experiences as those one has a higher-order thought about or perception of (e.g., Rosenthal 2002 , Caruthers 2000 . Such theories face the following dilemma. If they allow that reflexive thoughts and experiences count as the relevant sort of higher-order thoughts or experiences, there will be difficulty in supposing that any thoughts or experiences are not conscious-perhaps there will be no unconscious beliefs, no unconscious intentions, and no unconscious perceptual experiences. Even blindsight will count as conscious experience, because of the perspectival character of blindsight.
Your stomach apparently regularly tests its Ph-level. The resulting representation is perspectival and functions as a self-reflexive representation in the way it regulates the amount of stomach acid produced in the stomach to which it attached rather than something else. Presumably that does not count as a conscious representation because it is a subpersonal rather than personal representation-it is an experience of your stomach, not an experience of yours.
What about unconscious but self-reflexive intentions and blindsight? Someone might argue that they are subpersonal representations like representations of acidic level in the stomach and so they are not counter-examples to the claim that conscious states and experiences of the person are states for which there are corresponding higher-order thoughts or experiences. But this would be to identify almost all personal states and experiences with conscious states and experiences and the appeal to second-order representations would be doing no work.
I said there was a dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness. I just described the horn on which having a self-reflexive thought or experience counts as having the relevant higher-order thought or experience. If that horn is accepted, all or almost all thoughts and experiences count conscious, which is presumably an undesirable result.
The other horn is to deny that a self-reflexive thought or experience counts as the relevant higher-order thought or experience. What's needed, it might be said, is a higherorder thought that articulates a reference to the lower-order thought.
The problem with this horn is to find evidence for the existence of relevant higherorder thoughts or experiences which are not the thoughts or experiences themselves. In as much as the evidence is that conscious thoughts and experiences are thoughts and experiences one knows one has and can report to others, it would seem that, if higherorder states and experiences are needed to explain such self-knowledge and ability to self-report, it is unclear why the relevant higher-order states and experiences cannot be the original states and experiences themselves. What is added to the explanation if the relevant higher-order states and experiences are distinct from the original states and experiences?
In response to this dilemma, it might be suggested that the relevant self-reflexive states and experiences (or the distinct higher-order states and experiences) must be poised for free use in reasoning and rational control of thought. Block (1995) calls states and experiences meeting that condition "A-conscious" ("access conscious") and observes that many theorists identify consciousness with A-consciousness. But, like appealing to a distinction between personal and subpersonal states and events, this added criterion might be what's doing the work in distinguishing conscious from unconscious states and events.
Summary
I began by considering whether self-reflexive thoughts or experiences are possible and observed that worries about semantic paradox provide no reason to doubt their existence.
Next I considered whether self-reflexive thoughts or experiences required special conceptual resources and noted various ways in which such thoughts or experiences might be self-reflexive without containing articulated references to themselves. They might contain token reflexive notions. They might be perspectival through having de se content or through representing things from a certain point of view related to the relevant thought or experience. Their self-reflective content might function in a way that gives them a distinctive conceptual role. I suggested that positive intentions are self-reflexive in that such an intention involves a conception of itself as leading to the intended outcome. It may be that any intention is self-reflexive in involving a conception of itself as settling it
